Sun, 30 November 2008
The Mid-Pacific Information and Communications Technologies (MPICT) Center is a recently funded National Science Foundation (NSF) – Advanced Technological Education (ATE) Regional Center hosted by City College of San Francisco (CCSF). MPICT's mission is to coordinate, promote and improve the quality and availability of ICT education in a region consisting of Northern California, Northern Nevada, Southern Oregon, Hawaii and the Pacific Territories. Current Regional Partners include: Ohlone College , Santa Rosa Junior College , Cabrillo College and Foothill College.
We've had a great relationship with Pierre, James and CCSF and were fortunate to get them on camera to talk about MPICT at the 2008 SAME-TEC Conference.
MPICT is off to a great start under the leadership and direction of Pierre and James. Contact them for more information at www.mpict.org
Sun, 9 November 2008
German graduate students Erik Tews and Martin Beck have discovered an exploitable hole in WPA, a popular wireless encryption protocol. This week, Tews will present a paper on the topic at the PacSec conference in Tokyo. In this podcast Mike Qaissaunee and I discuss wireless network security and this newly discovered WPA hole.
Here's a list of questions asked during the podcast:
Where is the information for this podcast coming from?
Why is this important?
So, we've now got a security issue with WPA encryption! Before we get to WPA - can you give us a little background on wireless encryption?
So, the first attempt was WEP. Most devices still support it - why should we not use it?
So, that's not good. What did the IEEE do?
What else did the 802.11i group do - what was the second solution?
So, let me make sure I understand. Older wireless devices can be updated to support WPA which includes TKIP. Now, I've heard of WPA2 - what is that?
So, the new products support both but old products only support WPA. I think I've got it! What did Tews and Beck actually crack?
So the problem is with old devices that only support WPA and TKIP and not WPA and AES?
What is the problem with TKIP?Now, didn't WEP use checksums this way?
The ars technica piece mentioned short packets are ideal - especially ARP broadcasts. Why?
Let me see if I understand, an attacker sniffs a packet, makes minor
modifications to affect the checksum, and checks the results by sending
the packet back to the access point.
So it is not something we should be worried about?
What can we do to protect our networks?
Can you describe rekeying?
Now, I've heard of this - you need to be careful. You don't want to enable rapid rekeying unless ALL of your clients support IEEE 802.1x and an authentication method (e.g. EAP-TLS) that supports key distribution.
So, let's get to the point here - WPA really is not broken?
Listen to get the answers!
Sun, 2 November 2008
On Oct 1, 2008 Nart Villeneuve and the Information Warfare Monitor released an interesting joint report titled BREACHING TRUST: An analysis of surveillance and security practices on China’s TOM-Skype platform. Villeneuve is CTO of psiphon inc and the psiphon research fellow at the Citizen Lab, Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. In this podcast we discuss the report, confidentiality and security issues with TOM-Skype, the Chinese version of Skype
Mike: Gordon, Can you tell us a little more about this report?
The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada focusing on advanced research and development at the intersection of digital media and world civic politics. The author, Nart Villeneuve's research focuses on International Internet censorship and the evasion tactics used to bypass Internet filtering systems.
How about some background on Skype in China?
How about some details from the report?
You said these are publically accessible servers - can others besides the Chinese access these servers?
Can you review the major findings from the report?
What kinds of questions has the report raised?
How does the report say the sensorship actually works?
How about some detail on those servers?
The report claims it may be possbile to map users social networks using the logged information. Can you explain?
How has Skype responded?